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DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
O NE of the most firmly established principles of our
constitutional law is that legislative power cannot be
delegated.' Some writers 2 have traced the origin of
this principle to the ancient maxim, delegata potestas non
potest delegari; others have educed it from our system of
separated powers. Thus Cooley 8 says:
"Where the sovereign power of the state has located the authority,
there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws
must be made."
So also Burdick,' after referring to the general principle, de-
clares:
"This results from the clear declarations in our constitutions, both
federal and state, that all legislative power shall vest in the law-making
bodies which are thereby created."
1 CooLEEY, CoNSTTuxoNAL LnuTAToios (8th ed.) 224; 3 WmzLouony, Tnz
CoNsnnTU0NoA. LAw oY'THE UNITED STATS (2nd. ed.) 1636; Cheadle, Delegation
of Legislative Functions, 27 YALEn L. JouR. 892.
2 Duff and Wbiteslde, Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of
American Constitutional Law, 14 Colrz. L. QuAR. 168; Note, 20 Mixc. L. Rzv.
652.
3 Coor=, op. cit. supra note 1.
4 BuRmicz, LAW or TnE Ammuc Coz ismuTioN §60.
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Still others 5 rather confusingly refer to both the Latin
maxim and the doctrine of separated powers as indicating
the origin of the general principle. It has been argued that
the strict separation of powers was not contemplated by the
framers of the constitution 6 and that it is merely a practical
device, not indispensable to liberty." But whether we ascribe
the origin of the general principle against the delegation of
legislative authority to the Latin maxim or to the doctrine
of separated powers, it is now too firmly rooted in our juris-
prudence to be questioned.
The cases that have come before the United States Su-
preme Court involving statutes whose constitutionality has
been questioned on the ground that they delegated legisla-
tive authority are too numerous for discussion here. It is a
remarkable and significant fact that in nearly all of these
cases, where a federal statute was involved, the objection
was overruled and the statute sustained. In only four in-
stances, 8 according to the decisions of the Supreme Court,
did Congress attempt to delegate any of its legislative power.
It was no doubt this fact that led most writers on the sub-
ject to the erroneous conclusion that the Supreme Court
would sustain the National Industrial Recovery Act.' One of
the principal grounds of the decision in the epochal Schechter
case 10 was that by Section 3 of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act, Congress had unconstitutionally delegated legis-
lative power to the President. The constitutionality of many
other statutes of the New Deal depends on the same prin-
ciple. Thus the Agricultural Adjustment Act 11 gives the Sec-
5 Carpenter, Constitutionality of the National Industrial Recovery Act and
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 So. CA.. L. Ray. 125; Ray and Wienke, Hot
Oil on Uncharted Seas of Delegated Powers, 29 IL.. L. RaV. 1021, 1027.
6 Cheadle, op. cit. supra note 1, at 895.
7 Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 CoL. L. Ray. 379, 384.
8 Notes 10, 40 and 41, infra.
9 Ray and Wienke, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1025.
10 Schechter v. United States, 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935).
11 7 U. S. C. A. § 601 et seq.
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retary of Ariculture the power to tax processors and shippers
of agricultural goods to raise a fund for the reward of farm-
ers who agree to reduce their acreage in certain crops. The
Emergency Railroad Transportation Act 12 creates the office
of Coordinator and empowers him to make rules and regula-
tions that are in the public interest and tend to promote the
expressed purposes of the Act. The 1934 Amendment I of
the Tariff Act of 1930 gives the President authority to
change existing tariff rates whenever he finds that the present
ratq is an undue burden in detriment to the general policy
of the Act. So there are similar delegations of what may be
called legislative power in the Securities Act, 4 the Tobacco
Control Act,'5 and the Cotton Control Act. l6
The fact that all this legislation involves the delegation
of large discretionary powers to administrative officials lends
great interest and vital importance to the question whether
Congress in enacting these statutes has merely delegated a
"rule-making power," 1 as distinguished technically from
legislative power. Of course, any person who makes a rule
which the state will enforce, does in fact make a law, but
Professor Maurer's expression is a convenient term used to
designate -the power which Congress may constitutionally.
delegate.
An examination of a few of the leading and illustrative
cases will disclose that the general principle against the dele-
gation of legislative power has undergone "a considerable
metamorphosis" 11 and that the Supreme Court in its rarely
broken record of sustaining federal statutes has evolved two
theories as a means of rationalizing its decisions.
12 49 U. S. C. A. I § 250-267.
13 Act of June 12, 1934, 48 STAT. 943.
14 15 U. S. C. A. 9§ 77a et seq.
15 7 U. S. C. A.§ 751 et seq.
16 7 U. S. C. A. 701 et seq.
17 Maurer, Emergency Laws, 23 GEo. L. JoUR. 671, 684.
18 Note, 37 HAy. L. REv. 1118, 1119.
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JUDGE RANNEY'S RULE
The first of these theories is Judge Ranney's Rule, which
distinguishes between the delegation of power to make the
law and the conferring of authority to decide whether and
when the law shall be enforced. In language not very re-
markable for its lucidity, but which has often been quoted
in textbooks and in the opinions of our highest courts, in-
cluding the Supreme Court of the United States,1" Judge
Ranney of the Supreme Court of Ohio, in an early case 20
said:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exer-
cised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter no objection can be made."
It will be found, however, that the authority thus con-
ferred is not an absolute one, leaving it entirely to the execu-
tive official to determine whether the law shall be enforced.
The cases to which this theory is applicable are rather cases
in which Congress has made the enforcement of the law
depend upon the happening of a certain contingency and
has given some one else authority to determine when that
contingency has happened. Hence, the statutes to which
Judge Ranney's theory is applicable are properly described
as contingent legislation.
This is well illustrated in the first case 21 in which the
question of delegating legislative power was raised. By Act
of March 1, 1809, Congress had forbidden all commercial
intercourse with Great Britain or France, because of certain
edicts which those countries had issued in violation of our
neutrality. This Act expired with the session of Congress
on May 1, 1810, on which day, however, Congress passed
19 Foster, The Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Officers, 7
IIL. L. REv. 397, 402.
20 C. W. & Z. R. R. Co. v. Comm'rs Clinton Co., I Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852).
21 The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch 382 (1813).
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another Act providing that in case either Great Britain or
France should revoke the obnoxious edicts and that fact be
declared by presidential proclamation, then the previous non-
intercourse Act should be revived against the other nation,
unless the other nation also revoked her edict. On November
2, 1810, the President proclaimed that France had revoked
her edicts, but since Great Britain refused to revoke hers,
the nonintercourse Act of 1809 was revived against her. It
was held that in thus giving the President authority to re-
vive a previous statute by his proclamation, there was no
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
It will be observed that in this case, the specified con-
tingency was readily ascertainable by objective criteria. This
was not so in two other leading cases dealing with tariff
regulations. One of these 22 involved the McKinley Tariff of
1890. This Act provided for the free importation of sugar,
molasses, coffee, tea and hides. By Section 3, it was further
provided if the government of any country producing and
exporting these articles should impose duties on the products
of the United States that are reciprocally unequal and un-
reasonable, then the President should have the power to sus-
pend the other provisions of the Act which permit the free
importation of these articles. In sustaining Section 3, Justice
Harlan, speaking for the Court, said:
"It does not, in any real sense, invest the President with the power
of legislation.... Congress itself [determined the policy of suspension
and the duties to be levied] .... the President... had no discretion
in the premises except in respect to the duration of the suspension...
he was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and
declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect." (The
Court then quotes Judge 'Ranney's Rule.)
A writer 2 comments on the reasoning of the Court which
"operated to force the case into coincidence with the facts of
22 Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1891).
23 Comment, 31 MIcH. L. REv. 786, 791.
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The Brig Aurora" and characterizes it as an "unnecessary
bit of legerdemain," by which the Court, however, "at-
tained a commendable result."
The other tariff case 24 involved the flexible provisions of
the Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922. According to this Stat-
ute, whenever the duties imposed on imports from other
countries do not equalize the difference in the cost of pro-
duction in the United States and in the competing country,
then the President shall have authority to change the tariff
schedule so as to effect such equalization. Pursuant to this
authority the President raised the tariff on barium dioxide
imported from Germany. The plaintiff paid the duty at the
increased rate and then sought to recover the excess on the
ground the Statute had unconstitutionally delegated legis-
lative power. The Statute was again sustained.
It is interesting to notice the expansion and liberalization
of the criterion as compared with the previous case involving
the McKinley Act. Under that Act, the only discretion which
the President had was to decide whether the rates previously
fixed by Congress should go into effect; in the Act of 1922
he is authorized to make changes in the previously fixed
rates. In both cases, however, the authority is to be exer-
cised upon the happening of a specified contingency.
In these three cases, the authority to determine whether
the contingency had happened was given to the President.
But Congress has at times also given such authority to other
officials. The three bridge cases 25 involved Section 18 of the
Act of March 3, 1899, by which the Secretary of War was
authorized to make changes in bridges over the navigable
waterways of the United States whenever he finds that the
bridge erected or contemplated is an unreasonable obstruc-
tion to navigation. Said the Court, in sustaining this Statute:
24 Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928).
25 Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364 (1906); Monongahela
Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177 (1909!); Hannibal Bridge Co. v.
United States, 221 U. S. 194 (1911).
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"A denial to Congress of the right, under the Constitution, to dele-
gate the power to determine some fact or state of things upon which
the enforcement of its enactment depends would be to stop the wheels
of government and bring about confusion, if not paralysis, in the con-
duct of the public business."
PRimARY STANDARD THEORY
The cases discussed thus far come within the theoretical
range of Judge Ranney's Rule; but in cases where the legis-
lation is not contingent and that rule, therefore, inapplicable,
the Court has sustained the statute by resorting to what
may be called the "primary standard theory." In these cases,
the administrative body does not merely decide whether the
specified contingency has happened. It makes rules and reg-
ulations and can compel obedience by all persons to whom
they are applicable. The making of such a rule is, of course,
in a certain sense a law-making function, but where the
statute which confers the authority to make the rule also
prescribes some primary standard to which the regulations
of the administrative body must conform, then there is no
violation of the principle against the delegation of legisla-
tive power. The difficulty in the application of this theory
lies in determining the sufficiency of the primary standard.
The standards which have been held sufficient are of a great
variety and some of them exceedingly indefinite.
The first of the leading cases 28 applying this theory in-
volved Section 2 of the Act of March 2, 1897, the so-called
"Federal Tea Inspection Act," which authorized the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to make rules and regulations for de-
termining the quality of tea to be imported into the United
States and to exclude any tea that does not satisfy those
requirements. Under this Statute, eight packages of tea were
rejected as of inferior quality. Counsel for the importer con-
tended that the Statute was unconstitutional and relied on a
26 Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1903).
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strong line of state cases 27 condemning delegations of power
apparently less extensive than that of the Federal Statute.
But Justice White, speaking for the Court, said:
"The claim that the Statute commits to the arbitrary discretion of
the Secretary of the Treasury the determination of what teas may be
imported, and therefore in effect vests that official with legislative
power, is without merit. We are of opinion that the Statute, when
properly construed ...expresses the purpose to exclude the lowest
grades of tea.... This, in effect, was the fixing of a primary standard,
and devolved upon the Secretary of the Treasury the mere executive
duty to effectuate the legislative policy declared in the Statute."
A much broader scope for administrative regulation was
recognized in the Grimaud case,2" which dealt with the For-
est Reserve Act of 1897 authorizing the Secretary of the
Interior to make rules for the protection and preservation of
the public forests and provided that a violation of the rules
made by him should be punishable as a misdemeanor. In
1905, this authority was transferred to the Secretary of
Agriculture who accordingly promulgated inter alia Rule 45
forbidding the grazing of sheep on the Sierra Forest Re-
serve. For the violation of this rule, the defendant was in-
dicted. The case had a very checkered career, including a
change in the personnel of the Supreme Court,29 but in the
final decision the Court was unanimous in upholding the
Statute. Justice Lamar, writing the opinion, said:
"When Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give
to those who were to act under such general provisions 'power to fill
up the details' by the establishment of administrative rules and regu-
lations, the violation of which could be punished by fine or imprison-
ment. . . .That 'Congress cannot delegate legislative power [to the
President] is a principle universally as vital to the integrity and main-
tenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.' ...
But the authority to make administrative rules is not a delegation of
27 For a concise statement of these cases, see Cousens, The Delegation of Fed-
eral Legislative Power to Executive Officials, 33 MicH. L. Ra'v. 512, 518.
28 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1910).
29 Foster, op. cit. supra note 19, at 403; Ray and Wienke, op. cit. supra note
5, at 1026.
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legislative power, nor are such rules raised from an administrative to
a legislative character because the violation thereof is punished as a
public offense."
During the twenty years following the Grimaud decision,
there were many cases before the Court involving the ques-
tion now under discussion. The most important of these were
cases arising under statutes which delegate authority to the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Included in this author-
ity is the rate-making power. The Supreme Court has re-
peatedly declared that this is a legislative function.3 In-
deed the author of the standard text on constitutional law
regards that proposition as so well-settled that "citation of
authority is scarcely necessary." " Yet by the Hepburn Act
of June 29, 1906, Congress gave the Interstate Commerce
Commission authority to fix the rates that interstate rail-
ways might charge. And the Court, says Willoughby, 2 found
no difficulty in sustaining this delegation of authority. An-
other writer 83 declares that the right to delegate this author-
ity is "universally recognized."
This general attitude of the Court is strikingly illustrated
in the Intermountain Rate Cases, 4 involving the Mann-
Elkins Act of June 18, 1910, which made it unlawful for any
carrier to charge a higher rate for a short haul than for a
long haul, but gave authority to the Commission to suspend
the prohibition and permit the higher rate for the short haul.
The only primary standard contained in the Statute was
gathered by implication from other sections of the Act, di-
recting the attention of the Commission to the elimination
30 The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913); Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 305, 307, 318 (1913).
31 3 WILLOUGBY, T E CoNsTrTTn0NoA LAW OF Tm UNITED STATES (8th ed.)
1641.
32 2 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (8th ed.)
809.
33 Foster, op. dt. supra note 19, at 401.
34 234 U. S. 476 (1913).
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of "undue" and "unreasonable" discrimination. One writer 8'
finds it "difficult to regard this as more than a fatherly ad-
monition to legislate wisely." Counsel in the case cited an
"interesting chain of state decisions" which are succinctly
stated by Professor Cousens in an extensive note. 6 The
Court, however, in the instant case sustained the Statute.
Although the prestige of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, acquired through many years of successful regula-
tion, was an important factor in the rate cases, the major
consideration influencing the Court was undoubtedly the
necessity of the delegation. In the complexity of our modern
civilization, it is impossible for every legislator to know all
the facts and theories necessary for a proper solution of the
multifarious problems that lie within the field of congres-
sional legislation. Moreover, the mechanical unwieldiness of
a large legislative body renders it inadequate to the needs of
the.situation when immediate action is desirable. In line with
this reasoning is the statement of Justice White: 7
"Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably prac-
ticable, and from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to
executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by
the Statute. To deny the power of Congress to delegate such a duty
would amount to declaring that the plenary power vested in Congress
to regulate foreign commerce could not be efficaciously exerted."
So also Chief Justice Taft,8 in speaking of the assistance
which Congress may seek from the other branches of the
government, said:
"The extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according
to the common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental
coordination."
It has been frequently said 11 that the first case in which
a federal statute was ever declared unconstitutional on the
35 Note, 37 HAv. L. REv. 1118, 1120.
36 Cousens, op. cit. supra note 27, at 528.
37 In Buttfield v. Stranahan, op. cit. supra note 26.
38 In Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, op. cit. supra note 24, at 406.
39 Note, 2 U. or Cm. L. Rzv. 632; 48 HAav. L. REv. 799; Carpenter, op.
cit. supra note 5, at 126; 83 U. oF PA. L. REv. 527; Handler, The National In-
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ground that it delegated legislative power was the Hat Oil
Case 4o decided in 1935. But this is not so. On two previous
occasions did Congress attempt an unconstitutional delega-
tion. By the Act of October 6, 1917, Congress purported to
amend the Judicial Code by providing that in certain cases
of maritime jurisdiction the state law shall govern. A similar
amendment to the Judicial Code was made by the Act of
June 10, 1922. The Supreme Court held, in both cases, 1 that
in making these amendments Congress had unconstitutional-
ly attempted to delegate its maritime jurisdiction to the state
legislatures. The Statute involved in these two cases, how-
ever, did not deal with any general economic situation and,
therefore, the decisions in those cases cannot serve as a
precedent in determining how much of the New Deal legis-
lation is obnoxious to the general principle against the dele-
gation of legislative power.
This was the state of the authorities when the depression
came, followed in 1933 by a veritable flood of New Deal
legislation. The Hot Oil Cases involved Section 9 (c) of
the National Industrial Recovery Act, which authorized the
President to prohibit the transportation of hot oil in inter-
state commerce, that is, oil produced or withdrawn from
storage in excess of the amount permitted by state law. Pur-
suant to the authority thus conferred, the President issued
his order July 11, 1933. The petitioners, who were producers
of oil in Texas, sought to enjoin the federal authorities from
enforcing this regulation. The Court searched the 'whole
Statute diligently for some congressional expression that
might be taken as a primary standard, but could find none.
The lone dissenter, Cardozo, found such a standard in the
"declaration of policy" contained in the first section, but the
dustrial Recovery Act, 19 Am- BAR ASS'N JOUR. 440, 446; Editorial, 47 HAv.
L. REv. 85, 95; Cousens, op. cit. supra note 27; 23 GEo. L. JOUR. 321.
40 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935).
41 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920); Washington v.
Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219 (1924).
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Court said this general outline contains nothing as to the cir-
cumstances or conditions in which the transportation of
petroleum should or should not be prohibited.
The effect of the case is a decided check on the increas-
ing tendency to centralization of authority and the gradual
weakening of the constitutional safeguard which lies in the
separation of powers. The decision did not declare any new
principle or indicate any substantial change of judicial at-
titude, but it foreshadowed the decision in the Schechter
case 42 which, with one fell swoop, obliterated over 500
"Codes of Fair Competition."
This is the situation of the authorities as they stand to-
day. The nation now awaits with profound interest the final
decision in the cases which involve other New Deal legisla-
tion and which are now on their way to the Supreme Court.
William Sternberg.
Creighton University, School of Law.
42 Op. dt. supra note 10.
